Developing countries including India have been absolved of any responsibility towards reducing emissions in the first commitment period, 2008-2012, of the Kyoto Protocal. However, India is the fifth-largest emitter of fossil-fuel-derived carbon dioxide, and its total emissions are growing rapidly. India’s participation, therefore, in any future developing country commitment regime is a foregone conclusion. It is also obvious that, future negotiations on climate change will fix emission rights or entitlements for each country based on some commonly acceptable equity principle.

This study examines the consequences of India’s participation in a globally tradable carbon emission permits regime based on : (1) Grandfathered Emissions Allocation (GEA) scheme in which permits are allocated on the basis of emissions level of a predetermined year, say, 1990, (2) Dynamic Equal Per Capita Emissions Allocation (DEPCEA) scheme in which the aggregate emissions entitlements for India in different years are arrived at by multiplying the average global per capita emissions (1 tonne per capita as in 1990) with India’s population for the corresponding years, (3) Static Equal Per Capita Emissions Allocation (SEPCEA) scheme in which the aggregate emissions entitlements for India in different years are taken to be the product of average global per capita emissions and India’s population for a predetermined year, 1990, using a computable general equilibrium model of the Indian economy.

The results show losses in GDP and poverty alleviation in case of GEA, but gains for both in the cases of DEPCEA and SEPCEA. The gains are expectedly higher for the former, as it is the more generous allocation system for India.

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